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Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in
American Courts After LaGrand
Cara Drinan*
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in the case
of Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand) that Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") affords an individually
enforceable right to consular access upon arrest or detention in a foreign
country.' In the United States, death penalty opponents applauded the ICJ's
finding for its promise of greater due process protection, while states' rights
advocates criticized the decision as an unlawful exercise of criminal appellate
jurisdiction. LaGrand, in theory, resolves many questions that have plagued
American courts: whether Article 36 rights are vested in an individual or a
signatory state; whether the right may be privately enforced; whether domestic
procedural rules may bar Article 36 claims in certain circumstances; and
whether the ICJ's provisional measures are binding upon member states.
The LaGrand opinion, however, leaves unclear as many issues as it
clarifies. Procedurally, LaGrand has enormous implications for American
criminal courts if taken at its word. Yet it remains to be seen how, and if, the
American courts will incorporate the ICJ's decision in LaGrand into their
jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the
LaGrand issues in a comprehensive manner.2 As a result, courts vary widely in
" J.D., Stanford Law School, 2002; B.A., University of Oxford, First Class Honors,
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 1999; B.A., Bowdoin College, summa cum laude,
Economics, 1996. Special thanks to Margaret Pfeiffer and Sandra Babcock for introducing
me to this area of the law, and to Professor Abraham Sofaer for his guidance in my research.
1. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwwwlidocketligus/igusframe.htm.
2. The Court's most recent examination of related Article 36 issues was one in which
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their willingness to defer to ICJ opinions, and in many cases they have avoided
incorporation of ICJ law altogether by deferring to the political branches in
high-profile cases involving foreign national defendants.3
Even those courts that recognize ICJ opinions as contributing to American
common law are left with a critical gap in the LaGrand opinion: where a court
determines that there has been an Article 36 violation, what is the appropriate
remedy? Should the court treat an Article 36 violation as comparable to a
Fourth Amendment violation, thereby triggering a form of the exclusionary
rule? Should the court view Article 36 as akin to the effective counsel
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment? Or should the court defer to the United
States Department of State, allowing an infringement to be resolved politically,
perhaps only with an apology and a promise to be more vigilant in guarding
consular access in the future?
In this Note, I explore the potential impact of LaGrand upon domestic
American criminal jurisprudence with an eye toward what the case
demonstrates for America as a member of international institutions more
generally. In Part I, I describe the central holdings of the ICJ in LaGrand,
noting how dramatically LaGrand departs from what American courts have
previously interpreted the VCCR to require. Having demonstrated the
enormity of LaGrand's procedural implications, I examine early cases after
LaGrand and what they suggest about the American judicial response to the
ICJ decision in Part II. I argue that American courts err to the extent that they
recognize little shift in law after LaGrand. The ICJ directed the American
courts to craft a remedy in future cases that provides "effective review of and
remedies for criminal convictions impaired by the violation of the rights under
Article 36." 4 These words are not an escape hatch for American courts, but
rather an instruction to be respectful of the ICJ opinion in the context of
domestic criminal cases.
Finally, in Part III, I argue that American courts are well-equipped to heed
this instruction, for they are experienced in balancing rights and employing
prejudice analysis where the criminal adjudicative process has been tainted.
the Court lacked full briefing and argumentation. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380-
81 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I cannot say, without examining the record more fully,
that these [Article 36] arguments are obviously without merit. Nor am I willing to accept
without fuller briefing and consideration the positions taken by the majority .... More time
would likely mean additional briefing and argument, perhaps, for example, on the potential
relevance of proceedings in an international forum.").
3. See, e.g., Breard, 523 U.S. at 378 (deferring to the Executive Branch on the decision
to stay the execution of Breard, a Paraguayan citizen: "The Executive Branch ... in
exercising its authority over foreign relations may ... utilize diplomatic discussion with
Paraguay. Last night the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia
requesting that he stay Breard's execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision
of the ICJ, that is his prerogative."); see also Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir.
1999) (declining jurisdiction over defendant Faulder's "last-minute assertions" regarding
Article 36).
4. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 125.
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These models should be a template for the similar treatment of Article 36
violations. Such a model allows the courts to factually distinguish between
various Article 36 claims and to tailor narrow remedies on a case-by-case basis.
In fact, meaningful application of the LaGrand opinion in the United States
may enhance our own constitutional principles of due process while
simultaneously enhancing our role as a member of international institutions.
I. LAGRAND
Historically, American courts have minimized the importance of Article 36
rights, often incorrectly interpreting the obligations created by the VCCR
altogether.5 First, courts have treated the rights as belonging to VCCR
signatory states, rather than to individual defendants whose consular access has
been denied.6 Declining to clarify this issue, the United States Supreme Court
has conceded only that Article 36 "arguably" confers an individual right of
some kind.7 Second, courts have treated an Article 36 violation as one best
remedied through political means.8 Therefore, before LaGrand, Article 36
rights in practice posed little disruption to the standard adjudication of
domestic criminal cases.
In light of this historical treatment of Article 36, LaGrand represents a
mandate for significant change in the adjudication of cases involving foreign
nationals. Five holdings of the LaGrand decision deserve particular attention.
1. Article 36 "creates individual rights" for detained foreign nationals to
be informed "without delay" that they are entitled to receive consular
assistance if they choose.9
2. Article 36 stands for rights of the foreign national and the sending state
that are distinct from rights accorded to the foreign defendant under domestic
criminal law, such as the right to effective counsel. Article 36 may assist the
foreign national in securing private rather than court-appointed counsel, and
this distinction may be outcome-determinative.10
5. See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 386 (6th Cir. 2001)
(wrongly describing Article 36 as requiring "notification of the diplomatic representatives,"
rather than notification and the option of consular access for the detained foreign national
himself).
6. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2000) (following the State
Department's position that the VCCR does not create individual rights); see also Breard,
523 U.S. at 376.
7. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
8. See Li, 206 F.3d at 63 (deferring to'State Department conclusion that 'the [only]
remedies for failures of consular notification under the [Vienna Convention] are diplomatic,
political, or exist between states under international law."').
9. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 77 (emphasis added).
10. Id.at 91.
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3. A showing of prejudice to the foreign defendant is not required to
establish an Article 36 violation."
4. Where a state violates Article 36 by failing to inform a foreign national
of his right to consular assistance, that state cannot then invoke waiver as a
defense to a challenge based on that very same violation.1 2
5. Courts addressing an Article 36 violation may not invoke procedural
default rules to dismiss the case where the default itself is caused by an Article
36 violation. 3
Each of these holdings requires American judicial and executive agents to
modify their treatment of foreign nationals in the future.
First, the ICJ's determination that Article 36 creates an individually
enforceable right settles a long-standing question for American courts. While
this piece of the ICJ decision may have rung hollow in the LaGrand case, since
both of the LaGrand brothers had already been executed at the time of the
decision, the holding will have more significance in the future. No longer may
courts equivocate on this point. Now, when the American government
deprives a foreign national of his right to consular assistance, the foreign
defendant has standing to raise an Article 36 claim in a criminal trial.
Second, the ICJ's description of the right to consular access as distinct
from, and not cumulative of, rights accorded under domestic law such as that of
effective counsel requires greater diligence on the part of both executive and
judicial agents. Neither arresting officers nor judges may devalue the role of
the consular official on the rationale that counsel and consul provide effectively
the same resources.' 4
Third, the issue of prejudice analysis requires great judicial attention. The
ICJ opinion makes clear that a showing of prejudice is not required to establish
an Article 36 violation.'- However, it is my contention, as discussed below,
that compliance with the ICJ opinion is not feasible for American courts
without employing some type of prejudice analysis, at least in terms of
damages or impact assessment. The task remains, then, for the courts to
11. Id. at 74.
12. Id. at 60.
13. Id.
14. But cf Breard, 523 U.S. at 377 (dismissing any impact consular assistance would
have had upon the quality of Breard's defense, since Breard's attorneys were "likely far
better able to explain the United States legal system to him than any consular official would
have been").
15. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 74.
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reconcile the finding of a violation without a showing of prejudice and the
crafting of an appropriate remedy with such prejudice analysis.
Fourth, the ICJ's determination that a receiving state that fails to notify the
foreign national of his right to consular assistance may not invoke waiver or
procedural default creates an opportunity to bolster domestic safeguards of due
process. The ICJ was careful to state that procedural default per se has not
been called into question, but rather "its specific application in the present
case." 6 Thus, the ICJ condemned American refusal to entertain a claim where
the very reason for the tardy nature of the claim was intertwined with the
alleged violation of the defendant's rights. This notion is no different from the
domestic principles underlying Miranda warnings and the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary doctrine: Government violation of a defendant's rights may not
generate a windfall for the government's case against the defendant.
II. COMPLACENCE VERSUS COMPLIANCE
Theoretically, the ICJ's opinion in LaGrand requires dramatic change in
the law of consular access, but the question remains whether American courts
will comply with such mandates in practice. In the six months since LaGrand,
a handful of federal courts have rendered decisions in which defendants raised
the issue of the government's failure to comply with Article 36.17 These cases
suggest that the LaGrand decision- in particular its holding that Article 36
does create individual, legally enforceable rights- will not alter domestic law
as dramatically as the ICJ may have anticipated with its decision.
A. American Courts Have Failed to Correctly Interpret and Announce the
LaGrand Decision
First, there has been a collective judicial failure to explicitly address
LaGrand, let alone incorporate its holdings into domestic law under the
Supremacy Clause. 8 The one case that does mention LaGrand summarily
dismisses the import of the ICJ's decision by focusing on what the Court did
not decide explicitly-the issue of remedy. Declining to "decide" whether or
not Article 36 creates individually enforceable rights, the Tenth Circuit in
16. Id. at 90.
17. United States v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. De La
Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.
2001); United States v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Minjarez-
Alvarez, No. 90-1380-T, 2001 WL 848611 (10th. Cir. Jul. 27, 2001); United States v. Cowo,
208 F.3d 207 (Ist Cir. Nov. 20, 2001). This is not an exhaustive list, but these cases capture
the flavor of what lower courts are doing for the most part as well.
18. D.W. Cassell, Ignoring the World Court, CI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 1, 2002. ("In
the six months since the [LaGrand] ruling, 17 of 20 reported U.S. court decisions on
consular rights do not even mention the World Courtjudgment. None rely on it.").
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Minjarez-Alvarez referred to the LaGrand decision in only a brief footnote.
The Court justified its decision to deny a motion for suppression of statements
made in the absence of consular assistance, noting simply that "it does not
appear that the (ICJ) considered the applicability of the exclusionary rule to
violations of the Vienna Convention."19  Thus, the Tenth Circuit not only
focuses wrongly upon what the ICJ left open to domestic tailoring-the issue
of specific remedy-but also, the court refuses to be bound by the ICJ's
holding regarding the individual nature and scope of Article 36.
Second, courts have failed to treat LaGrand as the authoritative source of
law on the interpretation of Article 36, adhering instead to earlier domestic law
on point.20 In most cases, courts persist in following law as set forth by the
Supreme Court in Breard, and more recently by the First Circuit in United
States v. Li. For example, affirming the district court's refusal to apply the
exclusionary rule in light of an Article 36 violation, the First Circuit referred to
its own statements in Li, without mention of the ICJ, as recently as November
20, 2001 .21 Similarly, the Second Circuit in its De La Pava decision wrongly
cited the issue of Article 36 enforcement as "left open" under Breard2
Deferring to the Li opinion, the Court instead maintained that "the Convention
created no judicially enforceable individual rights."'  Thus, LaGrand's
announcement regarding Article 36 has yet to impact American courts in a
significant manner. The federal cases at issue here demonstrate a tenacious
attachment to the notion that Article 36 protects the interests of a signatory
state and is thereby best addressed in a political context.
Third, courts continually err by collapsing the distinct issues of consular
access and effective counsel and by invoking procedural default rules to bar
Article 36 claims. Both of these practices are in direct conflict with the
mandates of LaGrand. For example, refusing an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, the Second Circuit emphasized that since an Article 36 violation
putatively was not a basis for dismissal of an indictment, defense could not
prevail on an ineffective counsel claim by arguing that counsel failed to raise
the Article 36 argument.24 In doing so, the court condensed its inquiry of the
Article 36 issue into that of a Strickland analysis: Since the Article 36 claim
was deemed an inadequate basis for dismissal, the Court found no outcome-
determinative effect of counsel's failure to make an Article 36 argument 5
19. Minjarez-Alvarez, 2001 WL 848611 at *7.
20. See Cowo, 208 F.3d at 208; De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157; Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d
377; Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761; Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627; Minjarez-Alvarez, 2001 WL 848611
at *7 n.4.
21. Cowo, 208 F.3d at 208.
22. De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 164.
23. Id.; see also Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 388-91 (following the general principle that
treaties do not create privately enforceable rights and adhering to Breard).
24. De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 163.
25. Id. Cf Gibson v. United States, 98 CR 1428 (JSM), 2001 WL 1246574 (S.D.N.Y.
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This analysis dilutes the importance of consular assistance, for never does the
Court reach the potentially determinant nature of consular assistance in its own
right.26
Last, courts frustrate the goals of the VCCR, as articulated by the ICJ, in
their disregard for a meaningful remedy in cases where the government fails to
comply with Article 36. In many instances, there is no dispute as to whether
the government was remiss in its handling of a foreign national, for the
government concedes that law enforcement officials neglected to notify the
detained foreign national of his right to consular assistance.27 Even in such
cases, courts frequently dismiss requests for exclusion on the grounds that
Article 36-for whatever benefits it may offer-does not trigger application of
the exclusionary doctrine. 8
Indeed, the ICJ did not specify that exclusion of evidence, suppression of
statements, or dismissal of indictments was the appropriate remedy in cases
where the court finds an Article 36 violation. Nor are these judicially created
mechanisms necessarily appropriate in cases where the government fails to
comply with the VCCR. However, the ICJ left it to the United States to
determine an appropriate remedy that would give "full effect" to the meaning
of Article 36.29 The present trend of perfunctory evaluation of Article 36
claims and summary dismissal of traditional remedies does not meet the ICJ's
mandate in LaGrand. Courts must demand more from themselves by forming
creative and compliant remedies.
It is important to note that recently some courts have rendered decisions at
least in keeping with the spirit of LaGrand if not in explicit deference to it. For
example, in Standt, the court not only recognized the individual nature of the
Article 36 right, but it held that a claim of a VCCR violation could be brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 Rather than treating Breard as preclusive of the
Article 36 issue, the Standt court correctly noted that the Court had not
determined the nature of the right on its own accord.3' While this is a more
accurate reading of Breard than other courts have employed, the Standt court
still did not note that LaGrand did decisively resolve the nature and scope of
Article 36. Notwithstanding this oversight, the Standt opinion is encouraging,
for the case echoes the sentiments of LaGrand, even if it does so through its
Oct. 18, 2001) (minimizing the value of consular assistance and describing strategic benefit
from such assistance as "highly speculative").
26. Notably, there are many tangible benefits to consular access which are distinct
from those secured by the Sixth Amendment. See notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
27. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627; Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 387.
28. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 390-91; Cowo, 208 F.3d at 208; Minjarez-Alvarez, 2001
WL 848611, at *4-5 (holding that "since the Vienna Convention does not create fundamental
rights on par with those set forth in the Bill of Rights, we are unwilling to enforce Article 36
with the judicially created remedy of suppression." (citations omitted)).
29. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 91.
30. Standt v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417,423 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
31. Id.
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own textual and historical analysis. 32 Moreover, state courts have occasionally
indicated greater respect for the mandates of Article 36.33 Thus, there are some
indications that American courts can incorporate the obligations of the VCCR
in a meaningful manner.
B. Why Are the Courts "Getting it Wrong?"
Before exploring what steps are available and prudent for American courts
addressing Article 36 claims, there must be an explanation for the collective
judicial silence on the LaGrand decision. Why have so many courts failed to
heed the holdings of the ICJ, rather than treating the case as binding under the
Supremacy Clause? More curiously, why do many of them not even mention
the case by name? Some explanations are more generous than others.
Beginning with the most cynical, it is possible that these cases reflect a
conscious disregard for the ICJ decision rooted in either ideological opposition
to the role of the ICJ or fear of the practical impact which LaGrand threatens to
have. Ideological opposition, if it explains the absence of LaGrand references,
is misguided. Once the United States has ratified a self-executing treaty
without reservation, as is the case with the VCCR, 34 it is not for judges to
enforce the treaty on a discretionary basis; such treaties are the supreme law of
the land.35
As for fear of the practical fallout from LaGrand, this explanation for
judicial silence is equally unacceptable, even if based in reality. Indeed, as of
December 12, 2001, 118 foreign nationals from thirty-three different countries
faced a death sentence in the United States. Further, as the Death Penalty
Information Center has noted, Article 36 violations have been rampant in prior
capital cases:
Even applying the less stringent definition of prompt notification used by the
State Department, only 4 cases of complete compliance with Article 36
requirements have been identified to date, out of 131 total reported death
sentences (including those executed, reversed on appeal or released). In most
of the remaining cases, detained nationals learned of their consular rights
weeks, months or even years after their arrest, typically from attorneys or
other prisoners and not from the local authorities. As a consequence, consular
officials were often unable to provide crucial assistance to their nationals
32. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 422-427.
33. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 152 (Iowa 2001) (noting the importance of
consular assistance for detained foreign nationals).
34. Note that courts accept the VCCR as self-executing. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at
423 n.3 for a discussion of the VCCR's self-executing nature.
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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when it would be most beneficial: at the arrest and pre-trial stage of capital
cases.
36
If this empirical data is an indication of the scope of Article 36 claims that
may be brought in the future, then courts have reason to dread the caseload that
may ensue should LaGrand be incorporated into American law. Nonetheless,
courts are bound to decide cases based upon legal doctrine and precedent, not
"floodgate fears" which may govern any number of legal issues.
There are less pessimistic, very sound explanations for the judicial
reluctance to incorporate LaGrand's holdings into domestic criminal law.
First, many courts correctly note that legislators in 1963 did not intend for the
VCCR to alter domestic criminal procedure in the dramatic fashion that
LaGrand suggests.37 Second, there is a longstanding judicial tradition of
deference to the relevant political branch where international and policy
questions are implicated."
Related to this issue of agency deference, the United States State
Department has taken differing positions on the issue of Article 36.39 This
variance may be attributed to the different strategic interests in cases where the
State Department is a party to the litigation and those in which the Department
offers an advisory opinion only.40 Whatever the motivation for this shifting
State Department position, it does compromise the courts' ability to render
consistent decisions regarding Article 36.
Finally, two pragmatic factors may justify the courts' reluctance to address
the LaGrand decision. Courts are only required to address the issues that are
brought before them by the facts of a case and the advocates of each party. To
the extent that lawyers may be ill-informed regarding the VCCR and the ICJ's
interpretive authority over it, courts, in turn, do not confront the issue of
incorporation as frequently as they otherwise would. Moreover, district court
judges, with an eye toward insulating themselves from appellate review, may
opt not to include the ICJ opinion, even as persuasive authority. Judges have
little to gain by referring to the ICJ if they can dispose of a case on alternative
36. Regularly updated statistics from the Death Penalty Information Center are
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
37. Li, 206 F.3d at 65-66 (citing Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report from
1969 and the Committee's belief that '.[t]he [Vienna] Convention does not change or affect
present U.S. laws or practice."'); but see Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26 (emphasizing the
plenary and committee debates on the VCCR and their emphasis upon individual rights).
38. Li, 206 F.3d at 63 ("Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the
Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.") (quoting El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999)).
39. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d. at 426 (noting State Department's communication of
treaty obligations to state and local officials, but also official denial that the treaty creates
individual rights).
40. Id. at 426 n.6.
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grounds, and they may fear the attention and concern that an ICJ reference
would elicit from an appellate court.41
C. Despite Judicial Treatment of LaGrand to Date, the ICJDecision Is
Binding upon U.S. Courts
Although U.S. courts have been silent regarding LaGrand, the ICJ opinion
is the current authority on the interpretation of Article 36. It is binding upon
domestic courts for a number of reasons. First, the United States consented to
the interpretive authority of the ICJ when it signed and ratified the Optional
Protocol of the Vienna Convention.42 Second, according to the American law
principle of stare decisis,43 the United States may neither re-litigate nor
disregard the ICJ's determination of the scope and meaning of Article 36.
Third, as a "Treaty," the VCCR constitutes the law of the land, binding upon
the federal courts and states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 4 Thus, it is
imperative for American courts to ensure uniform compliance with the VCCR
as articulated by the ICJ, particularly with respect to Article 36.
III. A REMEDY COMPROMISE
The remainder of this Note focuses on the appropriate remedy for cases in
which the government fails to comply with the requirements of Article 36.
Notwithstanding the State Department's notification program,4 state and
federal officials continue to be inadequately informed regarding Article 36
protocol.46 Consequently, courts will continue to confront Article 36 claims, at
41. I am indebted to Professor Pam Karlan for this more generous and practical reading
of the courts after LaGrand.
42. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 15, 42,48.
43. For a discussion of the stare decisis doctrine generally, see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2. For a more lengthy discussion of Article 36 in American
courts see Linda Jane Springrose, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L. J.
185 (1999).
45. The State Department posts on its web site "Basic Instructions" and "Detailed
Instructions on the Treatment of Foreign Nationals," both of which are largely consistent
with the mandates of Article 36 as articulated by the ICJ. See Basic Instructions and
Detailed Instructions, available at http://www.travel.state.gov. Further, the Department
"sends regular notices to state and local officials reminding them of their notification
obligations under the Treaty." Standt v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 599 & nn. 211-14 (1997)).
46. See generally Violation of the Rights of Foreign Nationals Under Sentence of
Death, available at http:///www.ai.org ("Despite sporadic advisory notices from the State
Department, most state and local authorities remain ignorant of their Article 36
responsibilities. Gerald Arenberg, Executive Director of the National Association of Retired
Police Chiefs, was recently quoted as stating that: 'In my 47 years in law enforcement, I
1312 [Vol. 54:1303
June 2002] PRIVATE ENFOR CEMENT AFTER LAGRAND
least in the foreseeable future, where the remedy is the only issue. Moreover,
the remedy issue deserves particular attention because persistent non-
compliance with Article 36 is not a pattern by which the United States wants to
be recognized abroad.47 The United States already confronts international
objection to its death penalty practices, particularly with respect to juveniles.
Moreover, in the current political climate, a perceived American hypocrisy
regarding Article 36 creates a very real potential for international backlash.
Thus, there is a new degree of urgency in the resolution of Article 36 legal
issues.
Having noted that the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 is binding upon the
United States, the appropriate starting point for remedy analysis is the LaGrand
opinion itself. In LaGrand, Germany did not seek "material reparation for [the]
injury to itself and to the LaGrand brothers," but it did request "a general
assurance of non-repetition." 4 Moreover, Germany sought "assurances ... that
in any future cases of detention or of criminal proceedings against German
nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice the effective
exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and that in particular in cases involving the death penalty, this
requires the United States to provide effective review of and remedies for
criminal convictions impaired by the violation of the rights under Article 36." 49
Despite the United States' apology for the execution of the LaGrand brothers in
the absence of consular assistance, Germany sought more: It wanted a
guarantee that compliance measures would improve, and that if they did not,
criminal courts would account for the Article 36 violation.
In response to this request from Germany, the ICJ was vague-for better or
worse. The Court noted that if the United States should fail to provide consular
access in future cases of "prolonged detention" or "severe penalties," "an
apology [will] not suffice." 5° Rather, if there were a conviction or sentence in
such cases, the United States would be required to "review and [reconsider] the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in -the Convention."5' How exactly the United States should "take
account" of the violation was left open. As the ICJ stated, "[T]his obligation
can be carried out in a number of ways. The choice of means must be left to
the United States.' '52 Thus, the ICJ rebuked the United States for its mere
issuance of apologies in the wake of executions tainted by Article 36
have never seen anything from the State Department or FBI about this."').
47. See Erik G. Luna, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 149 (1999)
("Individual American citizens are placed in harm's way when the government fails to
adequately protect the rights of foreign citizens in the United States.").
48. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 124, 125.
49. Id. at 125 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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violations, and yet the Court conceded that the precise steps for guaranteeing
future effective remedies must be left to the United States.
The ICJ's invitation for the United States to craft a remedy for an Article
36 violation on its own initiative allows the United States to do so in a way that
comports with the requirements of its own system, while also protecting the
integrity of its reputation in international organizations. One can imagine the
appropriate remedy as somewhere in the middle of two unacceptable extremes.
The extreme ends of the remedy spectrum include: 1) exclusively diplomatic
and political resolutions, such as an apology; and 2) a version of an
exclusionary doctrine, where a violation triggers a remedy irrespective of a
prejudice inquiry. For reasons discussed below, I maintain that these extremes
are neither appropriate nor feasible. As such, I suggest a compromise that is
consistent with the goals of the VCCR, the ICJ's present interpretation of
Article 36, and the American criminal justice system.
A. Extreme Ends of the Remedy Spectrum
1. The diplomatic apology.
Before exploring the compromise model for an Article 36 remedy, one
must understand why neither of the extremes is an option worth pursuing.
With respect to the apology end of the spectrum-the status quo--both
political and philosophical rationales justify the eradication of this remedy.
The American justice system is predicated upon equal treatment before the law
and consistency in legal decisions for similarly situated parties. This same
concept should govern American legal actions in the context of international
institutions, particularly where, as here, the United States has formalized its
submission to the ICJ's jurisdiction. Moreover, as a matter of realpolitik, the
United States cannot enforce Article 36 on behalf of its nationals-as it did in
Iran in 1979 and Nicaragua in 1986-without recognizing that other signatory
states will expect reciprocal treatment where their nationals are concerned.53
Thus, in the interest of both institution-building and the principle of "pacta
sunt servanda, which states that treaties must be observed,"54 the United States
must demand more from its government than mere apologies for VCCR
violations.
53. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427 ("Reciprocity is the foundation of international
law.") (citing United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 & n.3 (D.V.I. 1999)).
54. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
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2. The exclusionary model alternative.
Perhaps, then, the appropriate remedy lies at the other end of the
spectrum-something closer to an exclusionary rule for Article 36 violations.
Intuitively, this holds some appeal. The Supreme Court has determined that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to compensate the victim of a Fourth
Amendment violation, but rather to deter the misconduct of law enforcement
officers: "[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it."5-1 Further, the Mapp Court noted the
practical dangers of not creating a remedy for the violation of fundamental
rights: "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws." '56 As Justice Brandeis had warned earlier, "Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example .... If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy."57
These principles resonate in the context of Article 36 violations. Just as
the United States should fear the reaction of its own citizens when it disregards
constitutional guarantees, the United States should also fear the reaction of
other nations when it fails to comply with its treaty obligations. In addition, the
United States may be seen as the "teacher" to which Justice Brandeis referred
in the international arena, and it should not take that role lightly. When the
world's leading democracy opts to selectively honor its obligations under
international law, it erodes its reputation as the democratic model in the eyes of
the world.
However, a pure exclusionary rule as applied in American courts under
Mapp is not necessarily the appropriate remedy in cases of American violations
of Article 36. This is true for a number of reasons. First, the Mapp Court,
which extended the federal exclusionary rule to apply to the states, rendered its
decision nearly sixty years after the Supreme Court first considered the
question of judicial remedies for unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 In
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960)).
56. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
57. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
58. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolfv. Colorado on the basis
of changed factual circumstances among the states; now all states must enforce the
exclusionary rule with regard to unreasonable searches and seizures); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 30 (1949) (holding that states may comply with the Due Process Clause by means
other than the Weeks exclusionary rule if consistent and effective); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that the exclusionary rule pertains to federal agents); Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904) (holding that the "courts [should] not stop to inquire as
to the means by which the evidence was obtained").
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contrast, the VCCR was ratified in 1963; litigation strategies based on Article
36 violations are still quite novel; 9 and the ICJ decision defining the scope of
Article 36 in LaGrand is less than a year old. Thus, American courts lack
Article 36 experience and data comparable to that which the Supreme Court
had at its disposal when it rendered its monumental decision in Mapp.
Enforcing any type of exclusionary rule in the Article 36 context would be a
drastic departure from current practice, and it is a course of action better
pursued, if ever, with greater knowledge and judicial experience.
Second-and related to the first point regarding the newness of Article 36
claims-is the gravity of enforcing an exclusionary rule in the Article 36
context. As the Court noted in Rakas, "[E]ach time the exclusionary rule is
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights."6 Likely bearing this social cost in mind, the Court was
careful not to extend the exclusionary rule until it had been empirically shown
that unlawful searches and seizures were a widespread phenomenon,
effectively leaving no deterrent option other than the deprivation of evidence.
American courts should be similarly cautious before implementing the
exclusionary model in Article 36 cases.
3. The middle of the remedy spectrum?
For the reasons discussed above, courts need to find an alternative remedy
to the two extreme options of apology and exclusion. I suggest that when the
government deprives foreign nationals of their right to consular access, courts
should entertain civil rights claims made by the foreign defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.61 This approach has several benefits, enabling a compromise
between the advocates of a diplomatic remedy for Article 36 violations and
those arguing for more extreme remedies such as exclusion.
First, a § 1983 action is appropriate in cases where the government
deprives a foreign national of his right to consular access because it serves the
purposes for which the statute was designed. A foreign national who has
suffered as the result of being deprived of consular access may wish to hold the
state authorities accountable. However, the Eleventh Amendment bars such a
59. See Jean Guccione, New Weapon in Defense: Foreign Consulates and Citizens of
Other Countries Detained in the U.S. Can Seek Help from Their Homelands, but the Results
Have Been Mixed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001 (noting that defense attorney Sandra Babcock
made prominent the VCCR violation argument in a 1996 death penalty appeal).
60. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427-28 (holding that the VCCR provides a
private cause of action for individuals and that as such a § 1983 claim should lie for the
defendant). But cf Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (rejecting a § 1983 claim by the
Consul General of Paraguay because he was not a "person within the jurisdiction" of the
United States within the meaning of § 1983); Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741, 742 (5th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant petitioner's request for § 1983 injunctive relief where the §
1983 action would effectively circumvent habeas procedure).
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defendant from suing the state directly for its failure to comply with VCCR
treaty obligations.62
The fact that Article 36 rights are not equivalent to fundamental or
Constitutional rights-an argument courts often use to dismiss the remedy of
exclusion in such cases-does not pertain in the § 1983 context. Courts have
recognized that § 1983 "provides a cause of action to redress the deprivation
'of any rights... secured by the Constitution and the laws' of the United
States, not only fundamental or Constitutional rights. '6
3
Moreover, § 1983 actions are consistent with the LaGrand opinion to the
extent that they do not require a showing of prejudice, but rather one of injury,
before an action may be possible. 4 While "the prejudice requirement was
developed in the criminal and immigration contexts,... as in other § 1983
contexts, a plaintiff bringing suit under the VCCR nbed only show that the
violation injured him."6
Prejudice analysis may play an important role in judicial calculation of
damages for an Article 36 violation. At that stage, the extent to which consular
access would have changed the outcome of a defendant's case becomes critical,
and courts will need a mechanism for categorizing violations as either harmless
or outcome-determinative. 6  While no violation is harmless in a pure sense, for
the signatory state and the foreign national are wronged whenever treaty
requirements are not met, factual differences may render some cases more
appropriate for § 1983 relief than others. Specifically, in a case where consular
notification is only minimally delayed, a damage award seems less likely than
one in which the defendant is executed never having had the benefit of consular
advice.
Ironically, the LaGrand case may not best demonstrate how an Article 36
violation can fundamentally compromise the quality of a foreign national's
defense. As the United States pointed out before the ICJ, the LaGrand
brothers, while technically German nationals, had lived in the United States
since early childhood and had returned to Germany only once for a period of
six months.67 They spoke no German, but rather only English, and they
"appeared in all respects to be native citizens of the United States."68
In contrast, the current death penalty appeal on behalf of Gerardo Valdez, a
Mexican citizen, highlights how helpful consular access can be to a foreign
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
63. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
340 (1997)).
64. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 74.
65. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
66. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 at 13.
68. Id.
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national uninformed about the American criminal process. 9 In Valdez's case,
Oklahoma officials neglected to notify Valdez of his Article 36 rights and the
Mexican consulate of Valdez's arrest and detainment; the consulate did not
discover Valdez's situation until two months before his scheduled execution
date. Valdez presents the quintessential case where consular assistance is
outcome-determinative. Valdez speaks only broken English; he clearly
misunderstood the concept of waiver based upon statements to the arresting
police; and immediately upon notification of Valdez's status, the Mexican
government formed a legal team that has been appealing his case since April
2001.70 A comparison of these two cases demonstrates that while prejudice
may not be essential to the threshold determination of an Article 36 violation, a
prejudice inquiry is paramount where a court seeks to determine the
appropriate remedy, even in the civil damage context.
There is, of course, the argument that a civil damages remedy is an
insulting suggestion given the binding nature of the VCCR and the potentially
decisive impact consular assistance may have in any given case. Yet the
remedy is not a vacuous one, for it may act as a deterrent in the future. If the
government learns that continued Article 36 violations generate expensive
litigation and damages awards, even if only in the form of attorneys' fees, then
the government will have a clear incentive to improve its Article 36
compliance. Moreover, since § 1983 claims often entail qualified immunity,
such suits may facilitate the announcement of new rights-rights that can be
more fully vindicated by future defendants whose Article 36 rights are
violated.7' Clearly, these justifications offer little comfort to Gerardo Valdez
and those in his position, for he seeks restoration of his rights where his life is
at stake rather than principles of international reciprocity. However, the
possibility of a remedy under § 1983 and other more revolutionary litigation
strategies are not mutually exclusive. Rather, civil rights damages claims may
offer some substantive relief unless and until American courts alter their
treatment of Article 36, by either applying the exclusionary doctrine in
appropriate cases or preventing procedural default in the habeas context.
CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have attempted to demonstrate both the importance of the
ICJ's decision in LaGrand and the bases upon which LaGrand should bind
American courts deciding Article 36 cases. Moreover, I have evaluated federal
cases following LaGrand in an attempt to determine what the American
69. See generally United States of America: A Time for Action-Protecting the
consular rights of foreign nationals facing the death penalty, at http://www.ai.org (AI Index:
AMR 51/106/2001).
70. Id.
71. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87 (1999).
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judicial response to the ICJ opinion may be in the future. I have argued that
these courts have erred in their treatment of Article 36 post-LaGrand, and that
courts need to consider the question of an appropriate remedy for Article 36
violations. Finally, I have advocated that rather than pursuing the extreme
measures of either mere apology or exclusion, foreign nationals should be able
to vindicate their Article 36 rights by pursuing a claim under § 1983. This type
of remedy, while perhaps not ideal in the long run, creates an immediate
incentive for better compliance with Article 36, and it honors the sentiments of
the ICJ decision in LaGrand. In addition, nothing about this civil remedy
precludes defense counsel from simultaneously pursuing more aggressive, and
therefore less obtainable, remedies such as exclusion or dismissal.
Greater protection for foreign nationals in the criminal system is a hard sell
today. As the United States continues its war upon terrorism, there is the
danger that xenophobia will infect not only our society, but also our legal
system. The government and the courts bear a special responsibility to ensure
that such prejudice does not prevail. As Justice Brandeis noted, the
government "teaches the whole people by example."72 In this case, the lesson
should be that when the United States commits itself to an international treaty
such as the VCCR, it vows to ensure compliance with the treaty at all levels of
government. Now, more than ever, if the government "becomes a
lawbreaker... it invites anarchy."73
72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
73. Id.
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